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JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT PRACTICE 
 
Shlomo C. Pill* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The classic adjudicatory paradigm of opposing attorneys facing off at trial before 
a judge and jury in order to receive a favorable judgment is an image long past.  
Increased litigation volume, and the added time and expense of modern litigation has 
resulted in a rich practice of judges working to broker settlements between litigants 
in lieu of formal adjudication.1  Judicial settlement is the subject of much debate, 
however, and the diverse range of judicial practice in this area reflects the 
institutional, ethical, and jurisprudential uncertainties we still have regarding the 
propriety of judges facilitating settlements.2  This paper offers a new perspective on 
the jurisprudential issues underlying judicial settlement practices by exploring the 
traditional Jewish law of judicial settlement practice.   
Part II of the paper begins by reviewing the state of judicial settlement practices 
in American courts today.  It starts with a brief history of alternative dispute 
resolution in the Federal courts and continues with a general overview of how judges 
work to facilitate settlements in practice.  Part III next explores the jurisprudential 
roots of the debate over judicial settlement by presenting three principle approaches 
to the goals of the judicial process and the propriety of judges engaging in settlement.  
Part IV turns to the traditional Jewish law of judicial settlement.  It begins by 
providing some necessary background about the Jewish legal system, discussing how 
Jewish law courts can resolve disputes through adjudication or settlement.  This Part 
																																								 																				
* Senior Lecturer, Emory University School of Law; Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Law and Judaism, 
Center for the Study of Law and Religion.  S.J.D, Emory Law School, 2016; L.L.M., Emory Law School, 2013, 
J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2012. 
 
1 Susan M. Gabriel, Judicial Participation in Settlement: Pattern, Practice, and Ethics, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 81, 81 (1988). 
2 Id. at 89. 
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continues by exploring a jurisprudential argument about judicial settlement recorded 
in the Talmud, and then by reviewing some of the practical rules about when Jewish 
law judges may encourage parties to settle.  Finally, Part IV concludes by inductively 
developing a Jewish law jurisprudence of judicial settlement.   
 
II. JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT IN AMERICAN COURTS 
 
This Part reviews the state of judicial settlement practice in American courts.  
Section II.a discusses the history and development of ADR processes, including 
judicial settlement, in the Federal courts.  Section II.b then presents some general 
observations about what judges do in practice when working to settle cases. 
 
A. The History of Judge-Facilitated Settlement 
 
While Americans have been using Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods to 
resolve what may have otherwise been litigious conflicts since the earliest days of the 
republic,3 judicial settlement practice – judges taking an active role in the non-
adjudicatory resolution of cases – has only gained prominence in the forty years 
since the 1976 Pound Conference drew attention to the potential of court-sponsored 
ADR methods.4  The Pound Conference was convened by the American Bar 
Association to address the “specter” of burgeoning trial and appellate dockets and the 
increasing financial and temporal costs of litigation.5  At the conference, Professor 
Frank Sanders advocated creating Dispute Resolution Centers where disputants 
might be directed to any number of appropriate resolution forums including courts, 
arbitration, and mediation.6  Sanders’ vision is now largely reality; over the past 
several decades partly on their own initiative but also in response to legislative 
directives, Federal and State courts have increasingly adopted court-sponsored ADR 
programs.7   
																																								 																				
3 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11 (2000); 
Harold Baer, Jr., History Process and a Role for Judges in Mediating their own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 131 (2001). 
4 See generally A. LEO LEVIN & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 
IN THE FUTURE (1979). 
5 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, in A. LEO LEVIN & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, EDS., THE 
POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65–66 (1979); see Floyd D. Weatherspoon, 
The Impact of the Growth of ADR Processes on Minority Communities, Individual Rights, and Neutrals, 39 
CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2011).  
6 See Sander, supra note 5, at 83–84. 
7 See Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States Federal 
Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 78 (2007);  Baer, Jr., supra note 3, at 133 (“For the 
most part, [Sanders’] vision has become a reality.”).  According to some accounts, ADR may account for the 
resolution of as many as two-thirds of civil cases in the United States.  See sources cited in Sylvia Shaz 
Schweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements, 20 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 51, 53 n.36 (2007). 
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The Pound Conference’s call for court-sponsored ADR was echoed by scholars 
and judges throughout the 1980s,8 and led to several Federal legislative initiatives 
designed to improve the availability and effectiveness of alternative dispute 
resolution methods within the Federal judicial system.9  In 1990, Congress passed the 
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which required courts to implement a case 
management system incorporating ADR methods to reduce the delay and costs of 
litigating in the Federal judicial system.10  The CJRA was followed by the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (ADRA),11 which mandates that all 
Federal courts implement court-sponsored ADR programs or evaluate and improve 
the programs they already have in place.12   
Congressionally mandated court-sponsored ADR programs are complemented 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in several ways direct judges to 
facilitate the non-adjudicative settlement of cases on their dockets.13  Rule 16 
authorizes judges to hold pre-trial conferences for the purposes of “expediting 
disposition” and “facilitating settlement” of the case.14  Rule 68, which sanctions 
parties who receive an adjudicatory resolution less favorable than one they might 
have received in a previously rejected settlement offer, further encourages case 
settlement.15  Rule 1, which instructs that the Federal Rules “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action,”16 provides further impetus to judges to utilize Rules 16 and 68 to encourage 
and facilitate settlement resolutions rather than adjudicatory dispositions of cases.17 
 
B. An Overview of Contemporary Judicial Settlement Practices  
 
Judges employ a wide array of techniques to affect case settlement without 
adjudication.18  While this Section provides an overview of these methods of 
																																								 																				
8 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (arguing that to fulfill their 
traditional roles, courts should be more open to alternative methods that will decrease the expense, time, and 
stress of dispute resolution).  
9 Many States also moved towards court sponsored ADR during this period.  See generally John V. O’Hara, The 
New Jersey Alternative Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a “Better Way”?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723 (1988);  
Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to 
Them for Trial, 2006 J. DIS. RES. 335 (2006). 
10 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-160 §§ 102–103, 104 Stat. 5089–96 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 471–82). 
11 Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58). 
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 651(b)–(d). 
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“[S]ettlement 
should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.”). 
15 See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
17 See Sylvia Shaz Shweder, Judicial Limitations on ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging 
Settlement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 51, 57 (2007). 
18 See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? – The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 
26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 53 (1994); Baer, Jr., supra note 3, at 131. 
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affecting settlements, it is by no means exhaustive; judicial settlement practices are 
likely as diverse as the judiciary itself.19  
Judge Baer neatly divides judicial settlement techniques into two categories.  
Some judges follow an evaluative approach in which the judge listens to each side’s 
claims and arguments with an eye towards developing one or a number of reasonable 
compromise-based resolutions that the parties might adopt.20  Others adopt a 
facilitative approach, which involves the judge aiding parties in developing their own 
solutions to the conflict based on mutual compromise.21  “Evaluative [judges] focus 
on obtaining a negotiated outcome . . . within the shadow of the law. . . .  Facilitative 
mediators focus on helping parties obtain solutions to problems that maximize joint 
gains.”22   
Within these two models there exists wide diversity in the mechanics of 
settlement practices.23  Some judges, like Judge Baer, pursue settlement in a relaxed 
manner, meeting with litigants and their attorneys, discussing each side’s case, 
holding joint meetings so that the parties can talk to and work with each other, and 
ultimately proposing a solution and creatively tweaking it to conform to each side’s 
interests until a settlement is reached.24  Other judges may take a more aggressive 
approach.25  Instead of acting as a facilitative mediator, some judges “push” parties 
to settle by subtly reminding attorneys of the expense of adjudication, by invoking 
the specter of losing at trial, and by implying their own preferences by calling a 
settlement offer “reasonable” or fair.26   
Some judges may approach settlement a good deal more aggressively, 
however.27  One judge, for example, “sometimes encourages litigants to talk 
settlement . . . by belittling the case with an observation like ‘You don’t want to go to 
trial with this!’”28  Others use leverage they may have over attorneys or parties to 
bring litigants to a settlement.29  Some judges are even known to employ settlement 
techniques considered unethical by many lawyers.30  Such methods include giving 
advice to the lawyer with the weaker case to encourage the other side to settle; 
speaking personally to litigants without their attorneys to convince parties to accept 
settlement offers; giving favorable ruling to the party with the weaker case to 
																																								 																				
19 Floyd, supra note 18. 
20 See Baer, Jr., supra note 3, at 136. 
21 See id. at 136–37. 
22 Deborah R. Hensler, In Search of Good Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice and Empiricism, in HANDBOOK OF 
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 231, 259 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, eds., 2001).  
23 See, e.g., James A. Wall, Judicial Participation in Settlement, J. DISP. RES. 25, 27–29 (1984). 
24 See Baer, Jr., supra note 3, at 137–42. 
25 Floyd, supra note 18, at 54. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 D. Marie Provine, Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges, 1986 FED. JUD. CTR. 1, 25 (1986) 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/SttlStrt.pdf. 
29 See Floyd, supra note 18, at 53–54. 
30 See id. at 55–56. 
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encourage the stronger litigant to settle; penalizing attorneys for not accepting 
reasonable settlement offers; and bad-mouthing recalcitrant attorneys to senior 
members of their firms.31  
 
III. JUDGE-FACILITATED SETTLEMENT: A DEBATE OVER JURISPRUDENTIAL 
VALUES 
 
Judicial settlement, in various forms, is widely practiced in American courts.  
Despite its actual prevalence, however, the propriety of judge-facilitated settlement is 
the subject of significant debate in the ivory towers of academia.32  Underlying the 
practical discussions about the ethical implications of judges facilitating settlements 
and courts’ institutional capacity for effective settlement-promotion33 is a deep-
seated jurisprudential debate about what values our justice system ought to 
promote.34  Positions on judicial settlement range from absolute condemnation on 
one end of the spectrum, to complete and indiscriminate approbation of the practice 
on the other, and a variety of more nuanced views falling somewhere in between.   
This Part addresses the jurisprudential debate over judge-facilitated settlement 
practice by considering four values-based approaches to the issue.  Section III(a) 
discusses what I call the “legal justice” view, which contends that judges never 
engage in facilitating settlements between litigious parties because the prime 
jurisprudential value of the court system is the resolution of cases in accordance with 
the law.35  Section III(b) considers the opposite view that our justice system should 
strive to resolve conflicts in a manner that best promotes peace and reconciliation 
among parties.36  Section III(c) next explores a middle-of-the-spectrum position that 
advocate for judges’ discriminate use of settlement to promote utility.  The 
“utilitarian” view maintains that judges should adjudicate or facilitate settlements 
based on which avenue of dispute resolution offers the most time and expense 
savings in each individual case.37  Of course, the perspectives on judicial settlement 
																																								 																				
31 See id. 
32 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Improving Judicial Settlement Conferences, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891 (2006). 
33 See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 18, at 57–82. 
34 See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An 
Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 1 (1989). 
35 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984);  Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986);  Richard Delgado, Fairness and Formality: 
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359, 1386–90 (1985); 
Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986). 
36 See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-taxonomies 
of Quality Arguments, 66 DEN. L. REV. 335, 374–79 (1989); Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 16–20;  Andrew W. 
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L. J. 1660 (1985). 
37 See, e.g., Warren Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. – A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976); 
Burger, supra note 8, at 276 (1982);  A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 
RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1985); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-
Stage Discovery Plan, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985);  STEPHAN B. 
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7–13 (2d ed. 1985); Lon Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 
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practices discussed here do not of course exhaust the full gamut of nuanced positions 
on the matter.  Nevertheless, these four generalized categories fairly represent the 
main jurisprudential value-based concerns voiced by principle participants in the 
judicial settlement discussion. 
 
A. Legal Justice 
 
Many commentators oppose judges engaging in facilitating settlements because 
they maintain that the courts and judges must promote what I call here “legal justice” 
above all else.  As used here, “legal justice” refers to those values established as legal 
norms through political and adjudicatory processes which represent society’s 
collective conception of proper social ordering.38  Legal justice arguments against 
judicial settlement comprise several distinct strains of thought about the proper 
institutional roles of judges and courts and the goals of the adjudicatory process. 
Some opponents of judge-brokered settlements begin with the premise that 
courts are quintessentially public institutions;39 they use public resources to employ 
public employees to resolve conflicts based on public values in a public forum.40  
Adjudication, the courts’ principle responsibility, is thus a public function; its 
purpose is not to maximize litigants’ private interests, but “to explicate and give 
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and 
statutes.”41  When judges work to settle cases, then, they undermine the courts’ 
public adjudicatory function and betray their public trust.42  Settlement resolutions 
are not based, at least principally, on legal values, though the probable result of an 
adjudicatory disposition may certainly influence parties’ bargaining positions.  
Instead, settlements are founded on parties’ compromising their legal rights in order 
to further their other private interests.43  Thus, by facilitating the settlement of cases, 
judges—in the interests of efficiency, private party preferences, or peace—allow 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 333–39 (1971); Frank Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 120–24 
(1977); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference, 33 UCLA. L. REV. 485, 486, 498–506 (1985).  
38 On this view, legal justice is the net product of legislative and adjudicatory processes’ evaluating and 
reconciling competing public and private values such as individual rights, economic utility, social cohesion, 
distributive justice, and others.  The law, the end product of the competition between these values represents 
society’s collective judgment about how to best conceive and order the public good.  Cf. Baruch Bush, supra 
note 34, at 4.  
39 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 35. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 1085. 
42 Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 5. 
43 See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 40–94 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining that 
settlements are successfully reached precisely by parties setting aside their legal rights and focusing instead on 
their real interests in the dispute); Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 5. 
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parties to leave court with their relationship structured not by the public law but by 
their own design.44 
Another common “legal justice” argument against judicial settlement considers 
that courts are not only in the business of “doing” legal justice in individual cases, 
but are also tasked with making legal justice in the sense of refining old and 
establishing new rules of public law.45  One of the public goods provided by the 
adjudicatory process, then, is courts’ development of legal rules by deciding concrete 
cases.46  By brokering settlements and nipping the possibility of adjudicatory 
resolutions to litigious matters in the bud, judges preclude themselves from fulfilling 
one of their chief functions.  Settlements make the cases they resolve simply go 
away; the parties leave happy and the judge clears his docket, but a non-adjudicatory 
resolution misses the opportunity to further refine public legal norms by deciding a 
concrete case.47 
 
B. Peace and Reconciliation 
 
For many judicial settlement advocates, law and justice are not synonymous.48  
Instead of finding jurisprudential ideals in legal norms, proponents of judicial 
settlement argue that the primary goal of dispute resolution processes should be to 
promote ideals like “reconciliation, social harmony, community, interconnection, 
[and] relationship.”49  On this view, judge-facilitated settlement’s promotion of peace 
and reconciliation among disputants serves important private and public goods. 
For some commentators, peace and reconciliation among litigants is a prime 
jurisprudential value because they see dispute resolution— even adjudication—as a 
fundamentally private process that should serve parties’ private good.50  The 
traditional model of adjudication sees dispute resolution as a means of private 
conflict resolution, a way for individuals who cannot agree about what values should 
control their conflict or on how accepted values should be applied to a particular case 
to obtain a neutral third-party resolution based on mutually agreeable principles.51  
On this view, the primary goal of dispute resolution is to achieve peace between 
litigants; the substance of resolution is secondary to its being mutually agreeable to 
																																								 																				
44 See Fiss, supra note 35 (“[W]hen the parties settle, society gets less than what appears” . . . disputants may 
walk away from the settlement content and at peace “while leaving [legal] justice undone.”); Baruch Bush, 
supra note 34, at 4–6;  Id. at 5 (“If private parties want to go to a mediator, let that be their decision as a matter 
of private choice. . . .  As a matter of public policy [however], we cannot put private benefit over the public 
good.”). 
45 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 
(1978). 
46 See David Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995). 
47 Id. at 2622–24. 
48 McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 36, at 1664–65. 
49 Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 6. 
50 McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 36, at 1660, 1664. 
51 See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964); LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF 
RULES 12–15 (2001). 
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and truly settling the conflict between the disputants.52  Judge-facilitated settlement is 
desirable— even preferable— to adjudicatory resolution because settlement achieves 
the private reconciliation between disputants that dispute resolution should 
traditionally serve.  When cases are resolved by adjudication there are winners and 
losers, rights and wrongs, and parties often leave court “whole” in a legal sense, but 
otherwise shattered and broken.  Settlement, by contrast, “is a process of 
reconciliation in which the anger of broken relationships is to be confronted rather 
than avoided, and in which healing demands not a truce but confrontation.”53    
The peace and reconciliation judicial settlement achieves between parties is also 
lauded as a public jurisprudential good.  Even if, as is the currently prevalent view, 
the adjudicatory process is not simply a means of resolving private disputes, but is a 
public function serving public ends,54 judicial settlement is desirable because the 
peace and reconciliation it promotes are indeed public values.55   
In adjudication, litigants see only as far as their own respective self–interests and 
are prepared to vigorously expend time and money to enforce their legal rights.  
Concluding disputes with adjudicative judicial rulings does not change this; one 
party’s interests are upheld, the others’ remain unfulfilled,56 and both walk away 
self–focused and bitter towards each other and those whose interests conflict with 
their own rightful entitlements.57  Settlement by contrast, results in disputants 
transcending their own self–interest in order to reconcile their differences through 
concession and compromise.58  By forcing parties to confront their conflict with each 
other and to work out a mutually agreeable solution to what simply amounts to a bad 
situation for both, the settlement process literally transforms disputants.59  Through 
compromise–based settlement, disputants come to appreciate that interests are 
pluralistic, that right–and–wrong is not black–and–white, and that they can live and 
work together with those whose interests and values differ from their own for mutual 
gain.  This realization, some advocates of judicial settlement assert, is a foremost 
																																								 																				
52 See generally Steven Ross, Discussion: The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting 
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 386 (1988).  
53 McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 36, at 1660, 1664. 
54 See, e.g. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282, 
1285–88 (1976); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185–86 (1958). 
55 Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 6, 9–13. 
56 See John E.Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. 
L. REV. 750 (1964). 
57 See Russel G. Pearce & Eli Ward, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal the Civic Culture: Confronting the 
Ideal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 16–25 (2011). 
58 See Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 11. 
59 See id. at 6, 11–12. 
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public value,60 and judges, as public officials should promote it by facilitating 






The notion that controlling the temporal and financial costs of adjudication is a 
principle jurisprudential objective for American courts is made explicit by Rule 1 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs judges to “secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”62  This sentiment was 
echoed by Chief Justice Warren Burger, who argued that “justice is all about” 
providing “mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possible 
time, with the least possible expense, and with a minimum of stress on the 
participants.”63  The utility of judicial settlement practices, which reduce the time and 
expense of adjudicatory litigation and clear court dockets, is thus a frequently cited 
justification for judges facilitating settlements.64 
Predictably, utilitarian arguments about judicial settlement are less enthusiastic 
about the practice than the peace and reconciliation–based views, but more approving 
than the legal justice position.  The utilitarian view of judge–facilitated settlement is, 
well, utilitarian.  Judicial settlement does not save time or money in all cases;65 some 
disputes do not lend themselves to compromise–based resolutions for a variety of 
reasons, and in such instances, a judge’s attempt to broker a settlement would likely 
cost more in time and money than adjudication and might be futile altogether.  The 
utility argument for judicial settlement thus contends for an active judicial role in 
settling some kinds of cases but not others.66  
Scholars have offered various criteria to asses in what kinds of cases judicially 
brokered settlements can be expected to offer net benefits over adjudicatory 
resolutions.67  Adjudication may be most efficient, for example for cases 
characterized by a “highly repetitive and routinized task involving application of 
																																								 																				
60 Baruch Bush, supra note 36, at 340–41, 376–77;  Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift 
from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1521–23, 
1532–39 (1986). 
61 See Arthur Kuflik, Morality and Compromise, in NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS 
38, 48–54 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1979); Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). 
62 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 1. 
63 Burger, supra note 8, at 274. 
64 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 (1995);  Marc Galanter, “... A Settlement Judge, not a Trial 
Judge:” Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J. L. & SOC’Y 1, 2 (1985). 
65 See Galanter, supra note 64, at 8–10. 
66 See Baruch Bush, supra note 34, at 2–3; Burger, supra note 8, at 275–76. 
67 See Sander, supra note 37, at 120–24. 
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established principles to a large number of individual cases.”68  Similarly, in cases 
involving multiple polycentric interests, where the process of hammering out a 
settlement could get mired in a quagmire of cross-cutting interests that evade any 
mutually agreeable resolution, adjudication may be the most efficient way to resolve 
the dispute.69  In this last example, the divide between peace and reconciliation 
settlement advocates and utilitarian’s is most pronounced.70  For reconciliations, the 
polycentric dispute is the quintessentially ideal case for judicial settlement since a 
compromise resolution is the only way to adequately address the interests and 
concerns of so many diverse parties.71  For utilitarian’s, by contrast, concerned 
primarily with the time and expense of various dispute resolution processes, 
multiparty disputes are more properly dealt with definitively through adjudication.72    
Cases well-suited for settlement on utilitarian grounds might be actions in which 
relatively little is at stake, financially, where litigation is spurred more by bruised 
egos and principle than financial incentives.  In such circumstances, cases could be 
disposed of most effectively with the flexible remedies available in settlement 
processes.  Similarly, efficiency is best served by settlement in cases in which 
litigants have an interest in maintaining amicable relations for future dealings.  In 
such cases, parties have an incentive to resolve their conflict based on mutually 
agreeable compromise, and settlement can likely be achieved at less cost and in less 
time than adjudicatory results.73 
	
IV. JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT PRACTICE IN TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW 
 
Traditional Jewish law, or halacha, offers a jurisprudential alternative to the 
currently prevalent values-based models of judicial settlement in American courts.  
This Part develops a halachic jurisprudence of judge-facilitated settlement that 
strongly encourages judges to promote and execute compromise-based settlements 
instead of adjudicatory resolutions, but only insofar as the extra-legal justice offered 
by settlement does not undermine the halachic conception of legal justice.74  The 
theory explored here is necessarily vague.  Traditional Jewish law adjudication and 
legal processes differs in fundamental ways from the American system; the language, 
concepts, and processes of the halachic system often lack precise American 
counterparts and evade precise comparative parallels.75 
To ease comparative analysis, Section IV. a provides an overview of the Jewish 
legal system, including the adjudicatory processes of Jewish law courts, or batei din 
																																								 																				
68 See id. at 118. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 32–33 (1963). 
72 See Sander, supra note 37, at 118. 
73 See id. at 121–24. 
74 MENACHEM ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 561–65 (1975). 
75 See id.  
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(singular, beis din).  Importantly, this Section explains that in the halachic system, 
courts may resolve cases one of two distinct ways.  First, batei din can adjudicate 
cases with din – law, that is, by formally deciding the matter based on an application 
of relevant Jewish law to the facts.76  Second, courts may resolve disputes with 
pesharah—compromise, a settlement process based on mutual concession, and extra-
legal principles of equity, fairness, and charity. 77   
  The following two Sections, IV. b and IV. c, turn to the substance of judicial 
settlement practice in halacha.  First, Section IV. b explores a polycentric Talmudic 
debate over the propriety of judges facilitating settlements based on three different 
conceptions of the jurisprudential values of dispute resolution, which closely 
parallels the contemporary American discussion.  Next, Section IV. c discusses the 
normative halachic approach to judicial settlement in practice, as set forth in 
principle codifications of traditional Jewish law.   
Finally, Section IV. d pulls together the foregoing discussion to offer a halachic 
jurisprudence of judicial settlement.  In an attempt to demonstrate how the Jewish 
law approach to judges brokering settlements between litigious parties can offer an 
alternative perspective on judicial settlement in the American context, I necessarily 
take some liberties in portraying halachic concepts to translate the Jewish law 
approach into terms useful to the contemporary American legal scene. 
	
A. Introduction to the Beis Din System: Two Models of Adjudication – Din and 
Pesharah  
 
Traditional Judaism is a primarily legal construct in which religious integrity is 
measured principally by Jews’ adherence to a comprehensive system of legal rules 
and principles that govern virtually every aspect of private and public life.78  Jewish 
law courts, which give authoritative advisory opinions on questions of Jewish law, 
legislate local ordinances, and adjudicate disputes, are a central component of the 
Jewish law system.79  Thus, the Torah instructs, “judges and court apparatuses shall 
you establish in all of your gates.”80  
As forums for dispute resolution, batei din may adjudicate cases in two different 
ways.  Most conventionally, Jewish law courts proceed in din, or “law.”81  When 
proceeding in din, a beis din adjudicates a case by hearing parties’ arguments, taking 
evidence, determining relevant facts and law, and ultimately applying the halacha to 
																																								 																				
76 See id. 
77 See id.  
78 See R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, 1 Gesammelte Schriften 83 [German] translated in R. SAMSON RAPHAEL 
HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND OBSERVANCES 247–48 (Dayan Dr. Isidore Grunfeld, 
transl., ed., 2d ed. 1968) (“What the Torah desires to regulate is . . . the whole of human existence – man’s 
sensual impulses, his needs and desires, his individual life as well as that of his family, society, and State.”) 
[hereinafter HOREB]. 
79 See ELON, supra note 74. 
80 Deuteronomy 16:18. For an overview of the beis din system see ELON, supra note 74. 
81 See ELON, supra note 74. 
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the facts in reaching a strictly legal decision.82  Din is the default model for beis din 
adjudication; courts will proceed in din unless litigants agree otherwise.83   
Alternatively, batei din may proceed in peshara, or “compromise.”  When 
proceeding in peshara, Jewish law courts resolve cases by brokering compromise-




B. Judicial Settlement and Jurisprudential Values: The Talmudic Debate 
 
The Talmud records a lengthy debate among the Tannaim85 regarding the 
legitimacy and propriety of dayanim facilitating, promoting, and executing 
compromise-based settlements of cases.86  One view, posited by R. Eliezer b. R. 
Yose the Galilean, militates against any judicial role in compromise-based settlement 
because legal justice – dispute resolution in accordance with substantive Jewish law 
– is the primary jurisprudential goal of adjudication.87  The second opinion, that of R. 
Yehoshua b. Korcha, strongly advocates for an active judicial role in settlement, 
arguing that peace and reconciliation among, and charity between disputants is a 
jurisprudential value placed above the primacy of substantive halacha.88  Finally, R. 
Shimon b. Menassiah held that judicial settlement practice is essentially value-
neutral; the propriety of judges engaging in facilitating settlement depends instead on 
litigants’ interests in a legal or compromise-based resolution as viewed from the 
perspective of the presiding judge. 89  
 
i. Legal Justice 
 
The first opinion recorded in the Talmudic debate over the propriety of judicial 
settlement practices is that of R. Eliezer b. R. Yose the Galilean.90  In R. Eliezer’s 
view, it is assur – prohibited – for a judge to engage in brokering compromise-based 
settlements between litigants in lieu of an adjudicatory resolution based on 
																																								 																				
82 See id. 
83 See generally EMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW (1990). 
84 Barruch Bush, supra note 34, at 33 n.73.  
85 See ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 505–07 (Fred Skolnik & Michael Berenbaum et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).  
Tannaim (singular, Tanah) refers collectively to the Jewish scholars of the first and second centuries, B.C. who 
recorded and compiled the text of the Mishnah, the work which forms the base upon which the Talmud provides 
explanation, discussion, and commentary.  Id. 
86 See generally BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1a–1b.  For a 
further discussion of this Talmudic debate, see CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW 
111–25 (2018). 
87 See generally JACK N. LIGHTSTONE, YOSE THE GALILEAN: I. TRADITIONS IN MSHNAH-TOSEFTA (1979). 
88 See Jack Bieler, The Qualifications of the Ideal Judge, YAAKOV BIELER (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://yaakovbieler.wordpress.com/2019/01/25/the-qualifications-of-the-ideal-judge/. 
89 See generally BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b. 
90 See generally LIGHTSTONE, supra note 87. 
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substantive Jewish law because courts’ exclusive responsibility is to give meaning to 
halachic legal values by ordering litigants’ relationships in accordance with the strict 
dictates of the law.91  On this approach, compromise-based settlements may be 
preferable to adjudicatory resolutions for several reasons, but they are beyond the 
proper institutional purview of the courts and the professional role judges.92   
The Talmud records R. Eliezer’s view as follows:93 
R. Eliezer b. R. Yose the Galilean said: “It is prohibited to execute a settlement; 
a judge that brokers a compromise-based settlement is a sinner, and one who praises 
such a judge blasphemes before God, as it says, ‘He who supports one who settles 
through compromise scorns God’ [Psalms 10:3].  Rather, let the law pierce the 
mountain, as it says, ‘For the judgment belongs to God.’  And so said Moses: ‘let the 
law pierce the mountain.’”94  Aaron, however, would make peace between man and 
his fellow, as it says, “The true Torah was in his mouth, and wrongness was absent 
from his lips; he [Aaron] walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and brought 
many back from wrongdoing” [Malachi 2:6].  [The Talmud then proceeds with two 
alternative homiletic interpretations of the verse in Psalms 10:3, which emphasize 
that one who receives an unlawful benefit blasphemes and scorns God.] 
R. Eliezer’s jurisprudential view of the goal of adjudication is exemplified by his 
refrain, “let the law pierce the mountain . . . For the judgment belongs to God.”95  For 
R. Eliezer, preserving the rule of law – God’s law, the halacha – is the courts’ 
paramount goal.  The halacha is God’s law, and the way in which it orders parties 
relationships is God’s conception of how human interactions should be regulated.  To 
reject the rule of law in favor of a settlement based on compromise is therefore 
blasphemous, as if to imply that the parties’ assessment of their interests and ordering 
their relationship is somehow superior to God’s law.96  “A judge that arbitrates a 
compromise under such circumstances insinuates that the compromise settlement is 
more [just] than the appropriate ruling based on the laws of the Torah.”97  R. Eliezer 
																																								 																				
91 See Bieler, supra note 88; Haim Shapira, The Debate Over Compromise and the Goals of the Judicial 
Process, 26–27 DINE ISR. 183, 209 (2009). 
92 See generally Shapira, supra note 91, at 209–11. 
93 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1a–1b. 
94 One Talmud manuscript reads, “as it says, ‘for the judgment belongs to God’.” Deuteronomy 1:17.  See 
Shapira, supra note 91, at 205 n.42.  
95 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b.  
96 R. Eliezer b. R. Yose the Galilean’s use of the word “blaspheme” in connection with settlements is instructive 
in this respect.  See Shapira, supra note 91, at 205 n.42.  The same descriptive is applied to Jews’ litigating 
disputes with other Jews in gentile courts.  See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, GITTIN 88b; Rashi on Exodus 21:1, 
SEFARIA, https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Exodus.21.1?lang=bi (last visited May 2, 2020) (s.v. lifneihem) 
(stating that a Jew who litigates in gentile court “profanes the name of God and gives honor to the name of 
idols”).  Commentators explain that the practice of litigating in gentile courts under gentile law rather than in 
beis din is considered blasphemous because it implies the supremacy of man-made legal systems and norms 
over divinely ordained and inspired ones.  See NESIVOS HAMISHPAT, CHIDUSHIM 26:4; URIM VETUMIM, URIM 
26:4.  Similarly, R. Eliezer’s view on judge-brokered settlements indicates that court-sponsored dispute 
resolutions based on litigants’ mutual consent and compromise is blasphemous because it implies the 
supremacy of human ordering over God’s law. See Shapira, supra note 91, at 209. 
97 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b n. 2 (Artscroll ed. 2009). 
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thus invokes the example of Moses, the quintessential Jewish judge, to demonstrate 
that when disputants submit their case to a court for resolution based on halachic 
norms, a judge may not broker a compromise in place of a legal disposition – even 
when adjudication will be costly and time consuming, when “the law must pierce the 
mountain.98  
Even on this view, the primacy of legal justice is not absolute.  R. Eliezer 
juxtaposes his reference to Moses’ judging in accordance with legal norms with a 
mention of Moses’ brother, Aaron, who “would make peace between man and his 
fellow.”99  R. Shlomo Yitzchaki, a foremost medieval commentator on the Talmud 
explains the reference to Aaron as follows: “Since he [Aaron] heard the dispute 
between them before they brought the case to court, he pursued them to make peace 
between them [by brokering a compromise-based settlement].”100  Thus, on R. 
Eliezer’s view, settlements are not all bad; to the contrary, Aaron is praised for 
executing settlements between disputants.101  The problem with settlements is when 
they are brokered by judges, judges who are professionally tasked with resolving 
cases based on halachic norms, judges who imply the deficiency of God’s law when 
they resolve cases through party-centered compromises.102  Tosfos, a collection of 
medieval commentaries on the Talmud further explicates this point:  “Since Aaron 
was not a judge, and since cases were not brought to him – but to Moses – for 
adjudication, it was certainly permitted for him [to broker compromise settlements 
between disputants].” 103   
 
ii. Peace and Charity 
 
The second Talmudic view on the jurisprudential suitability of judicial 
settlements is that of R. Yehoshua b. Korcha.104  R. Yehoshua disagrees with R. 
Eliezer’s condemnation of judge-facilitated settlements, and maintains that it is a 
mitzvah – an obligation – for judges to resolve cases by facilitating compromise-
based settlements between disputants.105  For R. Yehoshua, courts’ principle 
jurisprudential objective should be to promote peace and reconciliation among and 
charitable relations between litigants.106  To be sure, cases need to be resolved, and 
when parties’ differences cannot be amicably reconciled, the conflict must be firmly 
																																								 																				
98 See RASHI TO SANHEDRIN 6b:2 (s.v. assur livtzoah); RASHI TO SANHEDRIN 6b:3 (s.v. aval Aaron aoheiv 
shalom v’rodef shalom); Shapira, supra note 91, at 209.  
99 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b. 
100 RASHI TO SANHEDRIN 6b:3, supra note 98; see Shapira, supra note 91, at 209–211.  
101 See Shapira, supra note 91, at 209–11. 
102 See generally id. 
103 TOSAFOT to Sanhedrin 6b (s.v. aval Aharon). 
104 MASORET AKIVA, AKIVA TRADITION, A TORAH PUBLICATION OF FARBER HEBREW DAY SCHOOL – 
YESHIVAT AKIVA 1 (Farber Hebrew Day School, Vol. 2 2017), https://www.farberhds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Torah-Journal-2017-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
105 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1:1. 
106 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1:1. 
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adjudicated according to the strict letter of the law.  Nevertheless, legal adjudication 
should be a weapon of last resort; God first desires that people live peaceably and 
charitably with each other, and orders their relations in accordance with the law only 
when they fail to do so on their own.107   
The Talmud records R. Yehoshua’s position as follows: 
R. Yehoshua b. Korcha said: “It is a mitzvah, an obligation, to broker 
compromise-based settlements, as it says, ‘Execute truth and legal judgments of 
peace in your gates’ [Zacharias 8:16].  [How can there be ‘legal judgments of 
peace’?]  Isn’t is the case that wherever there is legal justice there is no peace, and 
wherever there is peace there is no legal justice?  What kind of justice also contains 
peace?  I would say it must be judicial settlement.  Similarly is says about [King] 
David: ‘[When he sat in judgment] David administered justice and charity’ [2 
Samuel 8:15].  [How could David administer justice and charity?]  Isn’t it so that 
wherever there is legal justice there is no charity, and wherever there is charity there 
is no legal justice?  What kind of justice also contains charity [as the verse implies]?  
I would say it must be compromise settlement.” 108  
Thus, for R. Yehoshua, the jurisprudential aim of court-sponsored dispute 
resolution is not legal justice.  Instead, the primary objective of court processes is to 
promote peace among and charity between litigants.109  As R. Yehoshua points out, 
charity and peace are indeed incompatible with strict legal justice; the former 
contemplates reconciliation and extra-legal magnanimity while the latter entails 
winners, losers, and often fails to resolve the underlying issues.110  Some measure of 
justice, however, can be realized in concert with charity and peace, through the 
process of judicial settlement, which promotes peace by flexibly addressing and 
resolving the litigants’ dispute, and which affects charity by leaving neither party 
entirely liable nor entirely successful.111 
After presenting R. Yehoshua’s view, the Talmud further clarifies the distinction 
between R. Yehoshua and R. Eliezer by offering two explanations of how on R. 
Eliezer’s legal-justice view of adjudication King David could mete out both justice 
and charity.112  The first explanation suggests that David meted out legal justice by 
adjudicating cases in accordance with the strict dictates of the law, but did charity by 
“repaying [the losing party] from his own treasury.”113  An alternative view, which 
best exemplifies R. Eliezer’s legal-justice conception of dispute resolution, explains 
that it was precisely through his meting out strict legal justice that David did charity:  
																																								 																				
107 See generally Shapira, supra note 91, at 211–13. 
108 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1:1. 
109 Indeed, according to the Mishnah, the values of peace and charity are proportionally related: “The more 
charity, the more peace.” MISHNAH, AVOS 2:7. 
110 But see, BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 1:1 (proposing that ideally legal adjudication promotes peace 
because litigants should “remove the dispute from between them, and accept the court’s judgment with a 
favorable disposition”). 
111 See Shapira, supra note 91, at 223. 
112 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b. 
113 Id. 
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“He did legal justice [for the winning party] by restoring his property, and charity 
[for the losing party] by removing wrongful gains from his hands.”114  These 
homiletic interpretations highlight the gulf between R. Yehoshua and R. Eliezer.  For 
R. Yehoshua, law and justice are not synonymous; the halacha offers one kind of 
justice, but another, superior form of justice that promotes the meta-halachic ends of 
peace and charity, is offered by judicially-brokered compromise-based settlements.  
For R. Eliezer, by contrast, law is justice, and the consequences of a legal 
adjudication represent all the positive values courts ought to promote.115    
 
i. Parties’ Interests 
 
The third view on the jurisprudence of judicial settlement, that of R. Shimon b. 
Menasiah, sees judge-facilitated settlement as inherently value-neutral.116  For R. 
Shimon, the primary jurisprudential objective of court-sponsored dispute resolution 
is disposing litigious suits in a manner consistent with the parties’ interests.117  
Settlement per se is neither obligatory nor prohibited; it is a form of dispute 
resolution that judges might decide to pursue or not at their own election, provided 
their choice is consistent with the litigants’ interests as objectively viewed from the 
perspective of the presiding judge.   
The Talmud records R. Shimon’s position as follows: 
R. Shimon b. Menassiah said: “Two people come before you for judgment.  As 
long as you have not heard their arguments, or once you have heard their arguments 
but do not yet know towards which side the law tends, you are permitted to say to 
them, ‘Go and reach a compromise-based settlement.’  However, once you have 
heard their arguments and you know which way the law tends, you may not say to 
them, ‘Go and reach a settlement.”  Of this it says, ‘Water is released at the start of 
judgment; abandon it before the case becomes clear’ [Proverbs 17:14] – until the law 
is revealed the judge may abandon it, but once it is revealed he may not leave it.118 
Thus, for R. Shimon, the propriety of judicial settlement does not turn on the 
value of the practice itself, but on the point in the adjudicatory process at which it is 
employed.  As long as a judge does not yet have a clear idea of which party will 
prevail in an adjudication, he may try to broker a settlement.  At that point, the 
litigants are uncertain about how they will fair if the case is litigated to decision, and 
each therefore has an interest in reaching a compromise-based disposition.  Once a 
judge can tell “which way the law tends,” however, he cannot facilitate a settlement.  
																																								 																				
114 Id. 
115 See EIN YAAKOV, Sanhedrin 6b (explaining that according to R. Eliezer, “when a judge imposes strict legal 
judgment, he by default succeeds on promoting peace and truth,” indicating that peace and reconciliation among 
litigants is not an independent adjudicative value, but is wrapped up in courts’ law-based conflict resolution); 
Shapira, supra note 91, at 211–13. 
116 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.; JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 1:1. 
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From the judge’s perspective, the winning litigant no longer has an interest in 
pursuing a settlement; to the contrary, his interest lies in obtaining an adjudicatory 
resolution to the case.119  The judge therefore cannot be a party to brokering a 
settlement because doing so would undermine the courts’ principle jurisprudential 
goal of resolving disputes consistent with both parties’ interests.120  As long as both 
litigants have an objective interest in settling, the judge may participate in settling the 
case based on mutual compromise; once one party no longer has an interest in 
settlement because he is likely to prevail in adjudication, the judge cannot facilitate a 
compromise resolution.121   
The Talmud further develops R. Shimon’s view by comparing judicial settlement 
to judicial recusal.122  If a judge is confronted by a dispute between two individuals, 
the Talmud states, one “gentle” and the other “harsh and dangerous,” the judge may 
recuse himself out of fear of the dangerous litigant so long as he does not “know 
towards which side the judgment tends.123”  Once he discerns the correct legal 
resolution of the case, however, the judge cannot step down because the Torah 
cautions, “[judges] shall not fear on account of men.”124  A judge may step down 
until he senses how he will likely rule because until that point the litigants do not 
have an interest in this judge resolving their dispute based on his particular view of 
the law and facts; the disputants have come to court for an adjudicative ruling, but 
not for any particular decision by a particular judge.  Once the presiding judge has a 
sense of “where the law tends,” however, he can no longer recuse out of fear.125  At 
that point, the parties’ interest – specifically the winning party’s interest – in this 
judge’s particular view on how to decide the case vests, so to speak, and the judge 
cannot step down without denying the litigants a judicial resolution consistent with 
their interests.126   
The Talmud applies the foregoing reasoning to explain R. Shimon’s view on 
judge-facilitated settlement.  According to R. Shimon, judges may work to settle 
cases until they know which litigant will likely prevail on the law because at that 
point the litigants have no vested interest in a particular adjudicatory result; to the 
contrary, each has a real interest in settling the matter rather than risk losing in 
court.127  Once they sense which party will prevail, if the case is litigated, however, 
judges may no longer broker settlements because now the expected winner has a 
																																								 																				
119 See Shapira, supra note 91, at 213–16.  
120 See id.  
121 See generally id. 
122 See id. at 214.  
123 See id. at 214–216.  
124 Deuteronomy 1:17; see generally BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 6b. 
125 See Shapira, supra note 91, at 213–16. 
126 See id. at 222–27  
127 See id. at 213–16.  
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vested interest in obtaining an adjudicatory disposition, and a settlement would no 
longer reflect his interests.128   
 
C. Judge-Facilitated Settlement in Halachic Practice 
 
In practice, the halacha was settled by combining the three competing views on 
judicial settlement posed by the Talmud.129  Judges are obligated to try to broker a 
settlement between litigants throughout the adjudicatory process, even after they 
know “which way the law tends.130”  Judges are prohibited, however, from brokering 
compromise settlements after they issue a halachic ruling in the case, though non-
judicial actors are encouraged to continue trying to get the disputants to reconcile 
their differences by facilitating a settlement.131   
Following R. Yehoshua b. Korcha’s view, the Shulchan Aruch, the principle 
codification of the halacha, instructs that a judge is obligated to try to push litigants 
to settle their dispute based on mutual concession and compromise.132  Indeed, “any 
beis din that succeeds in executing a settlement is praiseworthy.”133  Maimonides 
similarly taught that “a judge must strive in all cases to broker a settlement between 
the parties.  If he can refrain from adjudicating a case to verdict his entire life, 
constantly facilitating fair settlements between disputants – how wonderfully 
pleasant that is!”134  Commentators explain that a judge should explain to litigants 
why a settlement based on compromise is really in their best interests; he should be 
able to identify and speak to each party’s interests – “to speak to their hearts” – and 
to thereby bring them to compromise.135   
Judicial settlement is not unilaterally desirable, however.  Based on R. Shimon’s 
view in the Talmud, the halacha recognizes that at some point in the adjudicatory 
process the law-based resolution of the case becomes too concrete, and therefore a 
judge cannot broker a settlement without implying the inferiority of God’s law. 136  
Unlike R. Shimon, however, who placed this dividing line at the point where the 
judge knows “which way the law tends,” the halacha instructs that a judge should 
continue trying to broker a compromise until he issues his ruling.137  Once the court 
renders a verdict, it must “let the law pierce the mountain.”138  The Shulchan Aruch 
thus instructs:  
																																								 																				
128 See id. at 222–25. 
129 ELON, supra note 74. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. 
132 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 12:2. 
133 Id. 
134 MAIMONIDES, Introduction to the Talmud. 
135 SEFER ME’IROS EINAYIM (SMA), Choshen Mishpat 12:7. 
136 See Shapira, supra note 91, at 219. 
137 See Generally id.; ELON, supra note 74. 
138 See TOSEFTA, SANHEDRIN 1:2–3; MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 22:4; see also 
ELON, supra note 74. 
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When should a judge pursue settlement?  Only until the case is decided – even 
though he has heard their arguments and knows which way the law tends, it is his 
duty to broker a settlement.  After the case is decided, however, and he says ‘this 
party is liable and this party is exonerated,’ he may not broker a settlement between 
the litigants.139   
Thus, halachic practice incorporates elements of all three judicial settlement 
opinions recorded in the Talmud.  Judicial compromise is praiseworthy and 
obligatory, but only to an extent.140  Once the parties’ interests in a particular legal 
resolution have been solidified by an adjudicatory ruling, the judge may not pursue 
settlement.141  Instead, legal justice must prevail – “let the law pierce the 
mountain.”142 
 
D. The Jurisprudence of Judicial Settlement in Jewish Law 
 
The halachic practice of judicial settlement represents an amalgam of disparate 
Talmudic views on the propriety of judges brokering compromise-based settlements 
between litigants.  Each of these Talmudic approaches evinced a particular 
jurisprudential view on the goals of dispute resolution and the adjudicatory process.  
Halachic practice, which incorporates elements of each of these views presents yet 
another jurisprudential conception of settlement and dispute resolution, this one 
grounded in the moralizing nature of traditional Jewish law and the importance of 
self-transcendence and other-referentialism.143  This conception of the roles of 
disputants and judges in dispute resolution suggests an alternative to those models of 
judicial settlement practice currently prevalent in American courts.   
In explaining this unique halachic jurisprudence of judicial settlement, this 
Section begins by explaining that Jewish law’s principle objective is to empower its 
adherents to morally ennoble themselves through self-transcendence.  Next, this 
Section explores how this moralizing aim plays out in the context of adjudicatory 
dispute resolution.  Finally, this Section explains how the contours of halachic 
judicial settlement practice support this moralizing jurisprudential scheme. 
 In Jewish tradition, God is characterized by his self-transcendence, his tendency 
to act selflessly for the benefit of others.144  God gave the greatest expression his 
																																								 																				
139 SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 12:2. 
140 MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 22:4. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Shlomo Pill, Recovering Judicial Integrity: Towards a Duty-Focused Approach to Judicial Disqualification 
Based on Traditional Jewish Law, 39 FORD. URB. L. REV. 511, 534–35 (2012). 
144 See AVOS D’RAV NOSSON 4:5 (“The world was initially created with nothing but chessed, as it says, ‘For I 
[God] have said: “The world will be built with chessed.”);  R. MOSHE CHAIM LUZZATTO, 1 DERECH HASHEM 
2:1 (“Behold, the very purpose of [God’s] creating [the world] was to confer from His goodness unto his 
creations.”).   
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characteristic chessed145 when he created Man.  God created Man “in His own 
image,”146 and endowed him with God-like creativity and free will,147 and instructed 
him to use these abilities to harness the natural world to perform chessed for 
others.148  When Man heeds this call and selflessly acts to benefit others, he emulates 
God himself, making himself truly and morally human.149  By giving man the power 
(though not the license) to act contrary to His will, God subjugated his own interests, 
so to speak, for Man’s benefit, because Man’s decision to abide by God’s will is 
morally meaningful and ennobling only if he also has the power to reject God’s 
instruction.150  The Talmud thus teaches that Man becomes “a partner with God in 
the ongoing work of Creation” by transcending his natural self-centeredness and 
instead using his talents for chessed in accordance with God’s will.151    
The Torah, which includes legal rules and principles that govern every aspect of 
public and private Jewish life, teaches how to fulfill this chessed-imperative in 
practice.152  Jews fulfill their imatio dei obligation by transcending their baser 
																																								 																				
145 The Hebrew word, “chessed,” connotes self-transcendent and other-referential actions or character traits.  
Thus, an act of chessed is a performance focused on imparting good unto others rather than on accruing benefit 
to one’s self.  Similarly, a chasid – one who is characterized by chessed – refers to a person whose very being is 
imbued with a feeling of self-transcendence and a drive to do for rather than receive from others.  See HOREB, 
supra note 78, at 247–48 (“[T]he highest goal you can reach is to become a chasid, that is to say, a person who 
lives entirely, with everything he has, for the welfare of others, who is nothing for himself and everything for 
others.”). 
146 Genesis 1:27; cf. R. ELIYAHU DESSLER, 1 MICHTAV M’ELIYAHU 32 (1997) (“The power of giving is the 
greatest of God’s characteristics . . . and with this characteristic He created Man, as it says: ‘In God’s image was 
Man created,’ [Genesis 1:27].”). 
147 See R. CHIZKIYAH B. MANOACH (d. 13th century), CHEZKUNI, Genesis 1:26 (s.v. Na’aseh Adam) (explaining 
that just as God controls the heavens, so too, is Man empowered to rule over the earth);  R. OVADIAH SFORNO 
(d. 1550), COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH, Genesis 1:27 (s.v. B’tzelem Elohim) (reasoning that Man’s 
likeness to God lies in his ability to exercise free-will to choose between good and evil).  
148 See Genesis 1:28, 2:15 (“And God set a goal for them [Adam and Eve], and God said to them: ‘Be fruitful 
and multiply, and fill the earth, and conquer it . . . And God took Man and place and set him in the Garden of 
Eden to develop and guard it.”); NACHMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH, Genesis 1:28 (s.v. 
v’kivshuha); see also R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, THE NINETEEN LETTERS 62 (Joseph Elias, trans., ed., 1995) 
(“God created [Man] . . . to be, so to speak, a ‘partner in the work of creation,’ [Babylonian Talmud, Shabbos 
10a], able to direct the forces that make up our world and free to choose how to use this power.”). 
149 HIRSCH, supra note 148, at 64 ("Since God’s world is built . . . on lovingkindness, man’s duty to follow God 
and imitate His ways is discharged, in the first place, by doing acts of kindness.”). 
150 See R. YEHUDAH LOEW (1525–1609), DERECH CHAIM 2:1 (stating that Man makes himself truly human by 
choosing to govern himself with his intellect and awareness of his God-given purpose instead of with his base 
physicality); HOREB, supra note 78, at p. xliii (“What makes us into pious souls” is our striving “‘to perfect the 
world through the [chessed-focused] reign of [God].’”).  
151 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 10a; see Michael J. Broyde, Rights and Duties in the Jewish Tradition in 
CONTRASTS IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW, xxix (Daniel Pollack, ed., 2001) (“[Jewish law] is predicated on 
the duty to imitate the Divine.”); see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 133b (“Just as God is merciful and 
gracious, so should you act mercifully and graciously.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SOTAH 14a; MAIMONIDES 
(1135–1204), SEFER HAMITZVOS, POSITIVE COMMANDMENT 8 (n.d.); see generally R. MOSHE CORDOVERO 
(1522–1570), TOMER DEVORAH, ch. 5–6 (n.d.) (discussing Man’s duty to emulate God’s characteristics). 
152 See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 2 COLLECTED WRITINGS 207 (Marc Breur, et al, eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
Collected Writings] (“The Law [of the Torah] . . . establishes God’s will as the motive and measure of man’s 
ennoblement.”);  HOREB, supra note 78, at 219–20 (“[God] has announced His justice to the world [in the laws 
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instincts and choosing to act in accordance with the Torah's chessed-oriented norms 
instead.153  The Jewish law system thus functions primarily as a means of enabling its 
adherents to develop their humaneness by choosing to adopt God’s chessed-focused 
will as their own.154  The Midrash thus posits that “[t]he Torah’s laws were given to 
the Jews for the sole purpose of refining their social interactions.”155 
As a moralizing medium, the Torah relies principally on the process of Jews’ 
choosing to transcend their naturally self-referential instincts in favor of God’s own 
value judgments as revealed in the Torah.156  In other words, it is the process of self-
transcendence culminating in a conscious choice to submit to God’s will that is 
morally ennobling.157  When one acts on his own conscious, his conduct stems from 
self-referential instinct; when that same act is done as the mandate of an external 
moral authority, however, the performance becomes a moralizing act.158  The Talmud 
thus teaches, “one who is commanded to act and acts is greater than one who acts 
similarly but of his own accord,”159 and “[o]ne may do much or one may do little [in 
service of God], it is all equal provided each one directs and orders his heart with 
reference to Heaven.”160  Maimonides similarly taught, “[i]t is essential that the . . . 
Laws be obeyed as commandments of God and not as the result of man’s own 
speculative reasoning and moral discernment.”161 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
of the Torah] so that you may freely submit to Him in consequence of His command to you . . . and so that you 
may be just.”);  Steven H. Resnicoff, Autonomy in Jewish Law – In Theory and Practice, 24 J. L. & REL. 507, 
508–09 (2008) (“Jewish law assumes that there is a God, that God is morally perfect, that God wants human 
beings to act morally, and that God communicated to the Jewish people specific and general moral rules (Torah 
precepts).”).  
153 See Maimonides, Letter to Yemen, quoted in LAW, POLITICS & MORALITY IN JUDAISM 8 (Michael Walzer, 
eds., 2006) (“If [man] could only understand the inner intent of the law, he would realize that the essence of the 
true divine religion lies in the deeper meaning of its positive and negative precepts, every one of which will aid 
man in his striving after perfection.”); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 308, 309–11 (1961).   
154 This concept is illustrated by the following Talmudic teaching.  “R. Chanina b. Akashia said: ‘God, blessed 
be He, wanted to provide benefit to the Jews.  He, therefore, gave them a multitude of Torah commandments, as 
it says: “For the sake of upholding His justness, God made his teachings [the laws of the Torah] numerous and 
glorious” [Isiah 42:21]. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, MAKKOS 23b.  R. Shlomo Yitzchaki, an 11th century French 
scholar and author of the preeminent commentary on the Talmud explained that the multitude of halachic 
directives benefit adherents to the Torah because they provide additional opportunities for man to suppress his 
base desires and accept God’s will as his own.  See Rashi to Makkos 23b, SEFARIA, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Makkot.23b.1?lang=bi (last visited May 3, 2020) (s.v. L’zakos es Yisrael).   
155 MIDRASH RABAH, LEVITICUS 13:3. 
156 See HOREB, supra note 78, at lxxvii (“If a person makes the will of God his own will, and fights [his natural 
self-centered desires and impulses] . . . he develops his moral power although his action is not the consequence 
of his own moral discernment and of a purpose recognized by himself.  For moral power and one’s own moral 
discernment do not depend on one another.”).   
157 Id.  
158 Aharon Lichtenstein, Communal Governance, Lay and Rabbinic: An Overview, in RABBINIC & LAY 
COMMUNAL AUTHORITY 20 (Suzanne Last Stone & Robert S. Hirt, eds., 2006) ("[A]ction in response to the 
halakhic call is superior to the same act voluntarily undertaken."). 
159 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, AVODA ZARA 3a. 
160 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERACHOS 17a. 
161 MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Kings 8:11. 
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The beis din dispute resolution process, too, takes place under the aegis of the 
halacha’s overarching jurisprudence of moralizing self-transcendence and 
chessed.162  Jews’ self-transcendence in favor of God’s will is typically 
unproblematic in the private sphere.163  Jews study the halacha, self-apply the 
Torah's laws to their lives, and consult their rabbis when they are unsure how to 
conduct themselves under Torah law.164  Other-referential adherence to God’s law is 
more problematic in the public sphere where related parties often reasonably disagree 
about how the halacha structures their relationship.165   
Take, for example, an ordinary tort case.  Flames from D’s backyard BBQ pit set 
fire to P’s garage, which, along with the car inside it, burns to the ground.  P 
demands payment for damages, claiming that the halacha holds D liable for the 
damages caused by his fire.166  D disputes P’s claim, arguing that under the 
applicable halachic rules he is not liable for any of the damages because he took 
reasonable care in building and using his BBQ pit,167 and that in any case he cannot 
be held liable for damage to the car because while he may have been able to 
anticipate liability for damages to the garage, he could not have anticipated liability 
for the car concealed inside it.168  P counters that the law does not consider D’s 
precautions adequate and that he is also liable for the car because he should have 
reasonably anticipated that a garage might contain a car.169  Both P and D are 
attempting to order their relationship in accordance with God’s will as revealed in the 
halacha.  Because they are embroiled in a dispute in which each has a significant 
personal stake, neither party’s view of the law is truly self-transcendental; each is 
using the law to support his own self-interest, and each disputant’s adhering to his 
own conception of the halacha here would fail to achieve Jewish law’s moralizing 
goal.     
The problem is solved by the beis din dispute resolution process.  When parties 
cannot agree about how to order their relationship in accordance with God’s law, 
they turn to the court—a disinterested third-party decisor of Jewish law—to tell them 
what the halacha requires.170  From its objective vantage, the court can provide the 
parties with what they are unable to give themselves—a non-self-interested 
determination of what the law requires under the circumstances.  By accepting the 
beis din’s halachic judgment, each party transcends his own interest in the case and 
																																								 																				
162 Pill, supra note 143, at 534. 
163 Id.  
164 See MARC D. ANGEL, LOVING TRUTH AND PEACE: THE GRAND RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEW OF RABBI 
BENTZION UZIEl 83 (1999) ("One of the vital functions of the rabbi was to serve as a posek, a decisor of Jewish 
law."); JOSEPH S. OZAROWSKI, TO WALK IN GOD'S WAYS: JEWISH PASTORAL PERSPECTIVES ON ILLNESS AND 
BEREAVEMENT 54 (2004). 
165 See generally Pill, supra note 143, at 534.  
166 See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 418. 
167 See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 418:1. 
168 See id. at 418:8. 
169 See id. 
170 QUINT, supra note 83. 
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instead acts based on his legal obligations to his opponent,171 thereby morally 
ennobling himself through self-transcendence in favor of God’s will.172  Thus, when 
P and D bring their case to beis din and the court holds D liable for the garage but 
exonerates him with respect to the car, and thereafter, D pays for the garage, and P 
obviates his demand for payment for the car, both P and D morally ennoble 
themselves by transcending their self-interest and instead rendering to each other that 
which the halacha requires.      
Legal adjudication is not the only way for P and D to morally ennoble 
themselves through self-transcendent chessed, however.  Suppose D, knowing that P 
was in dire financial straits and feeling the weight of his Torah obligation to help 
others, did not contest P’s demand for payment in the first place but immediately 
wrote a check for the value of the destroyed garage and car.  D’s actions would serve 
the moralizing ends of Jewish law even though they did not conform to his halachic 
obligation to pay for the garage and not for the car.  D’s decision is self-
transcendental and chessed-focused; he is acting contrary to his own interests and 
beyond that which is legally required of him to fulfill his general Torah duty to act 
kindly and charitably towards others.  Alternatively, suppose P, who had an 
insurance policy that would cover most of his losses and was aware that D had 
recently lost his job and probably could ill afford to cover the damages, decided not 
to demand payment for D in the first place.  Once again, P’s other-focused act of 
chessed would serve to morally-ennoble him, despite the fact that his decision not to 
seek remuneration is contrary to how the halacha would order his relationship with 
D.  Finally, suppose that the parties do dispute D’s liability for damages, but each 
side, recognizing its general duty to act kindly and charitably towards his fellow, 
compromises on his halachic claims in order to reach a mutually agreeable 
settlement.  Once again, the litigants have morally ennobled themselves by 
transcending their own self-interest and strict legal entitlements in favor of acting 
charitably towards their opponent.  This kind of extra-legal, chessed-focused conduct 
																																								 																				
171 The moralizing self-transcendence that accompanies each parties’ compliance with the court’s judgment is 
reinforced by the notion that Jewish law speaks in terms of duties towards rather than rights against others.  See 
Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. & REL. 65, 65 (1987) (“The 
principle word in Jewish law, which occupies a place equivalent in evocative force to the American legal 
system’s ‘rights,’ is the word ‘mitzvah,’ which literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer 
to ‘incumbent obligation.’”); see also SOL ROTH, HALAKHA AND POLITICS: THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE STATE 97 
(1988);  Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at American Codes of Professional 
Responsibility through a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 182 (2007).  
Adhering to the court’s halachic decision is moralizing, therefore, because it doesn’t involve each parties’ 
receiving that which it is entitled to from the other, a self-referential act.  Instead, executing a halachic 
judgment involves each party’s giving to the other that which it is halachicly obligated to offer, a self-
transcendent, other-referential act of chessed.  See Silberg, supra note 153, at 312–13 (“[In Jewish law], when a 
person refuses to pay his debt he is physically coerced to fulfill his religious obligation to pay.  The concern of 
the court is not the creditor’s debt, his damages, but the duty of the debtor, his religious-moral duty, the 
fulfillment of a precept by him.  The creditor receives his money almost incidentally, as a secondary result of 
the performance of this duty.”). 
172 See generally Pill, supra note 143, at 534.   
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between disputants is called in halachic literature “lifnim m’shuras hadin”⎯beyond 
the strict letter of the law⎯and is eminently considered and praised.173    
With this conception of the premier moralizing aim of Jewish law, the function 
of adjudicatory dispute resolution, and the value of extra-legal settlements between 
litigants in hand, the jurisprudence of halachic judicial settlement practice becomes 
clear.  As R. Yehoshua b. Korcha argued in the Talmud,174 settlement is a positive 
value; by settling their dispute,  litigants transcend their personal interests and 
morally ennoble themselves through other-referential acts of chessed towards their 
opponents.175  Since settlement is moralizing, judges are strongly encouraged to 
broker compromise-based resolutions between litigants.176  After all, the whole focus 
of a Jewish law judge’s task is to enable parties to transcend their own interests 
through the court’s third-party legal judgment;177 if that end can be accomplished 
directly through settlement, all the better.  Thus, “[c]ompromise is the ideal legal 
solution, not strict adherence to legality.”178 
Judges cannot push litigants to settle after they have issued an adjudicatory 
ruling in the case, however.179  Once the correct halachic resolution to the case has 
been determined by the third-party court, the disputants must abide by the law.180  An 
individual would not be allowed to disregard an explicit halachic directive because 
he thinks the Torah’s general chessed-goal can be better achieved by some other 
course of conduct; doing so would be the epitome of the kind of self-referentialism 
the Torah expects man to destroy.  Likewise, a judge may not reject a settled 
halachic verdict in order to broker a compromise-based settlement because doing so 
would amount to both the judge and the litigants’ elevating their own view of the 
good above that of God’s law.181  Thus, following R. Eliezer’s view,182 it is 
																																								 																				
173 See, e.g., ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 1:2. 
174 See supra Part IV.b.ii. 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 168–173. 
176 See supra Part IV.c. 
177 See supra notes 104–120 and accompanying text. 
178 R. Joseph P. Soleveitchik, The Role of the Judge, in SHIUREI HARAV: A CONSPECTUS OF THE PUBLIC 
LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH P. SOLEVEITCHIK 81, 82 (Joseph Epstein ed., 1974). 
179 See supra Part IV.c. 
180 See supra Part IV.c. 
181 Worth noting is the fact that in large part the halachic system rejects the common-law notion that “the law” 
is out there somewhere just waiting for the erudite judge to find it.  To the contrary, the Torah teaches that the 
halacha “is not in Heaven . . . .  [R]ather, the law is very close to you; it is in your mouth and in your heart.”  
Deuteronomy 30:11–14.  The halacha is established by those who have authority to decide it, and until it is 
authoritatively decided vague notions about what the law should be or how a case should be decided do not yet 
have the force of law.  See generally Menachem Elon, Law, Truth, and Peace: "The Three Pillars of the 
World,", 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 439, 450–53 (1997).  Settlement is thus appropriate as long as a case has 
not been fully adjudicated to verdict by the court.  In theory, until the judge rules, the halacha says nothing on 
the matter, and a settlement cannot therefore be taken to denigrate God’s law.  Once the case is decided, 
however, there is Divine law “on point,” and a judge may not reject the halacha’s imperative in favor of a 
compromise-based settlement. 
182 See supra Part IV.b.i. 
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prohibited for a judge to broker a settlement once the court has reached a legal 
decision; at that point, the judge must “let the law pierce the mountain.”  
Thus, the jurisprudence of judicial settlement in halacha is a moralizing one.  
The purpose of dispute resolution is to give litigants a forum for transcending their 
personal interest in a conflict, help them see the case in terms of their obligations to 
their opponents rather than their own legal rights and entitlement, and ultimately 
morally ennoble themselves by acting with chessed rather than self-interest.  These 
aims can be achieved through legal adjudication, but settlement is preferable 
precisely because it is party-centered and involves litigants recognizing their duties 
to the other on their own instead of having those obligations declared to them by a 
court.  For the judge, however, the law is and must be paramount; once determined, it 
cannot be ignored, and so a judge cannot engage in settlement after he decides a case 
on the law. 
 
V.          CONCLUSION 
 
Judicial settlement has been a major feature of American court practice for over 
a generation.  Still, there is a fierce debate about the jurisprudential propriety of 
judges engaging in settling rather than adjudicating their cases.  Some decry the 
practice on the grounds that the judges’ job is to promote legal justice.  Others 
encourage judicial settlement, claiming that judges should be working foremost at 
promoting peace and reconciliation between litigants.  Pragmatists, however, see the 
judges’ role as using public dispute resolution resources as efficiently as possible and 
therefore advocate settlement in some cases while condemning it in others.   
Traditional Jewish law offers an alternative perspective of the goals of dispute 
resolution and the appropriateness of judges brokering settlements.  Jewish law sees 
self-transcendence, an individual’s ability to forego their own self-interest in favor of 
voluntarily acting charitably and kindly towards their opponents, is a primary 
jurisprudential value.  Judicial settlement can further this goal and is therefore 
encouraged.  Jewish law cautions, however, that as a legal professional, a judge’s 
first allegiance is to the law.  Once a case is decided therefore, and the law as to that 
particular matter becomes established, the judge may not forsake a legal resolution in 
favor of a compromise-based settlement.   
American views on law and dispute resolution are far removed from Judaism’s 
moralizing ideal.  Nevertheless, the kind of self-transcendence and focus on the other 
that is so central to Jewish law, and which is encouraged by the Jewish law 
jurisprudence of judicial settlement may be a worthwhile aim.  Certainly, it is food 
for thought in a still unsettled area of legal practice. 
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